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Abstract The craft beer segment in the U.S. has grown from a meager 20 brewers in the 1980s 
to over 7,000 today and is approaching a 15% market share. Macrobrewers initially responded by 
internal product differentiation but then began acquiring craft brewers, provoking concerns about the 
continuing viability of independent, local brewers. We analyze the economic consequences of the most 
prominent of these acquisitions: the Anheuser-Busch InBev (ABI) purchase of Goose Island in 2011. 
Using variation in pre-acquisition ABI market share to account for the effects of the distribution tier in 
the beer industry and the influence of macrobrewers on the distribution tier, we analyze price and 
quantity effects in the Midwest and mid-Atlantic states as well as the local region where Goose Island 
was founded. We also evaluate the effect on varieties of beer available to consumers in off-premise 
accounts to analyze the effect of ABI’s acquisition on independent, local breweries who must jockey for 
shelf space with macrobrewers. By the usual metrics of merger retrospectives, we find large gains in sales 
for craft brewers as a result of ABI’s entry by acquisition, possibly the result of marketing spillovers 
attracting new consumers to craft beer. We also find large negative effects on product variety, indicating 
greater difficulty for craft brewers to gain shelf placement in off-premise accounts. We find that these 





In the United States, it has become common for large, established companies to acquire small, innovative 
firms. In recent years, Walmart, GM, Ford, Apple, Alphabet, Amazon, Facebook, Twitter, Microsoft 
and Yahoo together have acquired over 800 such firms. These acquisitions, being small, often are not 
publicized outside of trade and industry circles. However, the economic climate that this strategy of 
corporate control creates may significantly alter the entry and exit conditions for new entrants and can 
shape the product offerings of incumbent firms that make these acquisitions. As Wollmann (2019) points 
out, because of their size, many of these acquisitions fall outside the scope of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. 
For this reason, the antitrust authorities at the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission 
might not take notice. 
In the malt beverage industry, megabrewers such as Anheuser-Busch InBev (AB InBev or ABI) and 
SABMiller (MillerCoors) have acquired a number of craft brewers in the United States. Within beer 
industry circles, the acquisition of small, local brewers by large, national brewers is heartening to some 
and disheartening to others.1 On the one hand, the prospect of being acquired at a premium valuation can 
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1 According to Noel (2018), after the news of Goose Island’s acquisition by ABI sunk in, friends of craft beer 
concluded: “Goose Island was a sellout. Anheuser-Busch was out to destroy craft beer. For twenty years, craft 
beer and Big Beer had been mostly parallel lines. The lines had intersected.” (p. 177) 
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be attractive to a pioneering craft brewer and induce entry by aspiring entrepreneurs. On the other hand, 
consumers who value craft beer for its small business and local ownership appeal worry that acquisitions 
of craft brewers by large incumbent brewers will taint the cachet of the craft segment.2 Craft brewers who 
go it alone fear that their access to distribution channels will be foreclosed relative to that of the acquired 
craft brewers. Testing whether megabrewer-craft brewer combinations have anticompetitive consequences 
for independent craft brewers and their customers is the theme of this paper. 
 
 
2 The Craft Beer Segment: A Brief History 
 
The year 1965 marks the taproot of the craft beer industry in the United States, when Fritz Maytag 
assumed ownership of the Anchor Steam Beer Company in San Francisco and pioneered a way forward 
for small brewers in the U.S. beer industry (Elzinga et al., 2015). At the time, the beer industry was 
highly concentrated and output was largely homogeneous, consisting of lager beer. 
While craft beer got its start with Maytag’s entrepreneurial endeavors, the segment was slow to 
realize growth and popularity. Only 100 craft brewers existed in 1987. Since that time, there has been an 
explosion of new entrants. Over 7,000 craft breweries now operate in the United States. Most of these are 
small producers whose individual market share is de minimus (Elzinga et al., 2015). In fact, small-scale is 
part of the official definition put forth by the Brewers Association, which defines a craft brewer as small,3 
independent,4 and, naturally, a brewer5. The growth in the craft segment has several explanations: a 
decrease in taxation of craft beer in 1978,6 the expansion of brewpubs after their federal legalization in 
1978,7 growth in personal income, and consumer demand for product variety.8,9 
The success of the craft beer movement was achieved in part through the product’s differentiation 
compared to the relative homogeneity of the lager beer produced by the major brewers. Over time, 
the macrobeer industry evolved into primarily producing a “light beer” (i.e., low calorie) malt beverage 
whose popularity allowed the exploitation of scale economies. Today three of the four leading brands of 
beer sold in the U.S. are low-calorie beers.10 Craft beer filled a demand gap that opened in part because 
of the close proximity in taste, quality, and price of the major brands. The craft industry also possesses 
public policy support, exemplified through the recent decrease of the federal excise tax on beer, a feature 
of the Craft Beverage Modernization and Tax Reform Act.11 
Consumer demand for beer in the U.S. is supplied largely by ABI and MillerCoors. For some years, 
these firms could ignore the craft segment and did. However, in recent years, these firms have embarked on 
a wave of acquisitions of craft brewers. Craft brewers now produce over 12% of industry output (Brewers 
Association). The arrival of the craft segment is the most important contemporary development in the 
domestic beer industry. The interest and importance of craft beer is reflected in a growing literature.12 
 
 
2 If the cachet of the craft beer is based on locally owned, locally brewed product, the size and geographic 
footprint of Boston Beer sits outside both of these metrics. Boston Beer (primary brand, Samuel Adams) had 
sales in 2018 of 4.3 million barrels, making it the sixth largest brewer in the United States (Steinman, 2019a). 
Jim Koch, the founder of Boston Beer, is a member of the Bloomberg Billionaire group; his stature, and that 
of the firm he founded, also does not fit the conventional image of the scrappy craft brewer carving out a 
niche in an industry dominated by megabrewers. 
3 “Annual production of 6 million barrels of beer or less (approximately 3 percent of U.S. annual sales). Beer 
production is attributed to a brewer according to rules of alternating proprietorships.” (Brewer’s Association, 
nd) 
4 “Less than 25 percent of the craft brewery is owned or controlled (or equivalent economic interest) by 
a beverage alcohol industry member that is not itself a craft brewer.” (Brewer’s Association, nd) 
5 “Has a TTB Brewer’s Notice and makes beer.” (Brewer’s Association, nd) 
6 In 1978, Congress decreased the federal excise tax from $9.00/barrel to $7.00/barrel for the first 60,000 
barrels produced by breweries with less than 2 million barrels in total annual sales. 
7 While federal law permitted home brewing, legalization at the state level was not completed until 2013 when 
the last states, Alabama and Mississippi, legalized home brewing. 
8 See Tremblay and Tremblay (2011) and Silberberg (1985). 
9 “American beer drinkers discovered variety. Tastes diversified. Anheuser-Busch could no longer simply 
suffocate competition. It needed craft beer. So it bought Goose Island.” (Noel, p. xi) 
10 Bud Light, Coors Light, and Miller Lite. 
11 The Craft and Beverage Modernization and Tax Reform Act (CBMTRA) went into effect January 1, 2018 
and will “sunset” on December 31, 2019. Under the bill, the federal excise tax decreased from $7.00/barrel 
to $3.50/barrel for the first 60,000 barrels of domestic brewers producing less than 2 million barrels annually 
(Brewer’s Association, nd). 
12 The best treatments are Acitelli (2013), The Audacity of Hops: The History of Americas Craft Beer 
Revolution and Lewis (2014), We Make Beer: Inside the Spirit and Artistry of Americas Craft Brewers. Book-
length treatments of individual craft brewers include Beyond the Pale: The Story of Sierra Nevada Brewing 
Co. by Grossman (2013) and Beer for Pete's Sake by Slosberg (1998). Steve Hindy, one of the founders of 
The Brooklyn Brewery, also has written a history of craft brewers: The Craft Beer Revolution (Hindy, 2014). 
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3 Beer Distribution 
 
After Prohibition ended, a three-tier system was mandated in order to prevent the excesses and moral 
degradation that purportedly catalyzed the outlawing of alcoholic beverages under Prohibition. Federal 
law enabled states to mandate that there should be an independent distributor (i.e., the additional tier) 
positioned between the producer tier and the retailer tier. The supposed goal of requiring a third tier 
between the brewer and the retailer was to deter promotional strategies and actions on the part of a 
vertically integrated brewer-retailer that might stoke the demand for malt beverages in such a way as to 
cause alcoholism or alcohol-induced crime. 
The result is that many distributors have contracts with major brewers to sell the brewer’s products 
exclusively within a certain geographic region. This creates unique incentives for a brewer to structure 
contracts to induce the distributor to market its product line as opposed to its competitors’ products 
to on-premise retailers (bars), as well as off-premise retailers (grocery stores, convenience stores, liquor 
stores, etc.). 
Distributors also may control placement of products within the beer section of a supermarket or 
convenience store. As a “category captain,” a distributor may determine what brands are placed next to 
each other, and the individual shelf level or cooler door where particular brands are displayed. Within 
the industry, shelf placement and shelf space are important marketing variables. For example, eye level 
products or products on an aisle endcap are more likely to be seen and bought by consumers. Pricing 
and shelf placement strategies may induce substitution towards one brand and away from another. 
 
 
4 Distribution by the Two Brewers 
 
As of 2016, ABI and MillerCoors sold about 2/3 of all beer in the U.S.13 Because of the existence of only 
two major sellers, there usually are only two major distributors in any one geographic area, one for the 
brand portfolio of ABI brands and one for the brand portfolio of MillerCoors. These same distributors also 
may contract with craft brewers in the area who want access to and distribution in their territory. Until 
recently, ABI and MillerCoors did not have a product to challenge craft beers in the market. However, 
with the acquisition of several craft breweries by the two dominant brewers, there is now concern among 
the craft segment that ABI and MillerCoors will use their influence with distributors to foreclose other 
craft brewers from on-premise as well as off-premise accounts. The National Beer Wholesalers Association 
spoke to this in a letter to the Department of Justice regarding the merger between ABI and SABMiller, 
noting, 
 
“Through incentive programs to promote ABI beers at the expense of rival brands, influence over 
distribution management, substantial control through the equity agreement and by other means to 
control independent distributors, the DOJ has found that ABI can inhibit craft and rival brewers 
access to the market through ABIs distribution partners (National Beer Wholesalers Association, 
2016).” 
 
While the combined ABI and MillerCoors share of market (SOM) is large, it has been in a free-fall 
since the start of the twenty-first century. Over the past decade, ABIs volume fell almost 20 million 
barrels, almost all of this decrease taking place in ABIs two major brands, Budweiser and Bud Light. 
This loss in sales is the equivalent of shuttering four modern breweries. In terms of market share, ABI has 
lost approximately eight share points. (Steinman, 2019b). This loss in volume took place notwithstanding 
the acquisition of ten craft brewers and the acquisition itself of Anheuser-Busch by InBev.14 
While the tailspin at MillerCoors has not matched that of ABI in reduced barrelage, in relative terms 
MillerCoors decline has been greater. In the past decade, MillerCoors volume dropped 14.5 million barrels, 
the equivalent of three modern breweries. The joint venture of Miller and Coors never experienced a year 
in which total sales for the combined firm grew. MillerCoors held a SOM of 30 percent in 2008; in 2018, 
the MillerCoors share was just under 24 (Steinman, 2019a). As macrobeer sales have decreased, their 
 
 
13 Unless cited otherwise, all figures are from the 2016 Beer Industry Update (Beer Marketer’s Insights, 2016). 
14 During this period, Anheuser-Busch has diversified through acquisition into other potables including tea, 
energy drinks, hard seltzer, and even spirits. Recently ABI acquired Cutwater Spirits, a firm founded by 
the same team that founded Ballast Point, a craft brewer acquired earlier by ABI. (Steinman, 2019a). 
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distributors became wary about the future of Big Beer and focused their attention on growth sectors such 
as import brands, craft brands, and flavored malt beverages.15 The macrobrewers have taken notice.16 
Table 1 shows U.S. share of beer sales by segment, comparing 2018 to 2013. In 2013, Craft SOM 
was just under eight share points; Import SOM was just over thirteen. Imports now stand at just over 
seventeen; while Craft is just over twelve. Imported beer maintained a consistent segment share lead over 
craft beer, the delta between Import and Craft remaining stable at about five share points. 
At one time in the U.S., imported beer primarily meant beer from Canada, Germany, and the Nether- 
lands. No more. Table 2 shows the shipments of imported brands in 2018. Constellation’s portfolio of 
Mexican brands now has five of the top ten brands being sold in the U.S. Almost all of the growth in 
imports is accounted for by sales growth from South of the border. Note the absence of any import beer 
among the top ten brands from North of the border. Once prominent Canadian brands in the Molson 
and LaBatt portfolio have faded. 
 
 
5 The Major Brewers and Craft Beer 
 
Prior to the expansion of craft brewers in the United States, the beer industry sustained a dramatic 
decrease in the number of producers. The number of conventional lager breweries in the U.S. fell from 
421 in 1947 to 20 in 2006, as firms either merged or exited the market (Elzinga et al., 2015). This drop was 
the result of economies of scale in production and marketing, which benefitted the large macrobrewers 
but pushed most of the medium-sized brewers out of the market (Elzinga (2016), Tremblay and Tremblay 
(2011)). 
High profile acquisitions and mergers at the top of the international macrobrewer food chain also 
have contributed to the diminishing number of conventional breweries. In 2002, South African Breweries 
acquired Miller Brewing Company to form SABMiller. In 2005, Molson Brewery of Canada and Coors 
Brewing Company merged to form the Molson Coors Brewing Company. In 2008, SABMiller and Molson 
Coors formed the joint venture, MillerCoors, for operations in the United States. Also, in 2008, Belgian 
brewing firm, InBev, acquired Anheuser-Busch to create Anheuser-Busch InBev (ABI).17 ABI engaged in 
a Brobdingnagian $107 billion merger with SABMiller in 2016. As a result of that combination, Molson 
Coors assumed sole ownership of MillerCoors. 
Production of “phantom” craft beer brands was the macrobrewers initial response to the growth of 
the craft brewing market.18 In 1988, Miller bought Jacob Leinenkugel Brewing Company, the first such 
acquisition. In 1995, Miller also purchased Celis Brewery and a 50% share of Shipyard Brewing. In 2000, 
Miller shut down Celis Brewery and sold Shipyard back to the original owners. With the exception of 
Leinenkugel, which went on to become part of Miller’s craft and import business development unit, Tenth 
and Blake Beer Company, these initial acquisitions were not distinguished by their commercial success. 




6 ABI and the Craft Segment 
 
In Barrel-Aged Stout and Selling Out: Goose Island, Anheuser-Busch, and How Craft Beer Became Big 
Business, Josh Noel noted “the announcement of Goose Island’s $38.8 million sale to the world’s largest 
beer company, on March 28, 2011, functionally ended an era for craft beer-an era of collaboration and 
cooperation, growth, and good vibes, and the shared cause of building a lifeboat in a sea of Big Beer 
banality.” (Noel, p. xi) Noel added, 
 
 
15 An example of a flavored malt beverage would be Mike’s Hard Lemonade. 
16 Kostov (2018) and Bostwick (2018) of the Wall Street Journal both describe how the decrease in sales of 
macrobeer such as Bud Light as well as the rise in popularity of craft beer have prompted distributors to 
reconsider their business models. 
17 For detailed account of the hostile takeover of Anheuser-Busch, see Dethroning the King (Macintosh, 2011). 
18 Anheuser-Busch was the first mover in this product space with Elk Mountain Ale in 1994, followed by Red 
Wolf Lager brand that same year. Miller followed suit by introducing its Red Dog brand through Plank 
Road Brewery, an in-house subsidiary of Miller that focused on craft beer products. The most successful of 
these phantom brands was Blue Moon, developed by Coors in 1995. MillerCoors now sells over 2 million 
barrels of Blue Moon per year. Blue Moon’s success prompted ABI’s 2006 release of its similarly marketed 
brand Shock Top, which reached an annual production of 900,000 barrels in 2014. 
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“Goose Island reached a unique place in the American craft beer industry. It was a rare hybrid, 
serving local, national, and international audiences. It made beer for Chicago, it made beer for 
stadiums and airport bars, and it was a brand to be exported to Europe and China, Australia 
and South America. After all the scaling and tweaks, Goose IPA was essentially Anheuser-Busch 
IPA. 312 was Anheuser-Busch Wheat Ale… All became tepid Big Beer reinventions of what they 
had been when made in Chicago.” (Noel, p. 329) 
 
Goose Island was a natural candidate for acquisition, ABI already had a minority stake in the 
company, and it was consistently the second or third largest craft brewer in the six-state area in and 
around Illinois each year from 2004-2009 leading up to the acquisition . In addition to purchasing stakes 
in Spiked Seltzer, Virtue Cider, and the Craft Brew Alliance,19 ABI has since purchased nine other craft 
breweries under its High End Brands subsidiary: 
 
– Blue Point Brewing Co. (New York-based firm selling 60,000 barrels/year at time of purchase, acquired 
in 2014 for an estimated $24 million) 
– 10 Barrel Brewing Co. (Oregon-based firm selling 40,000 barrels/year at time of purchase, acquired 
in 2014 for an undisclosed amount) 
– Elysian Brewing (Washington-based firm selling 54,000 barrels/year at time of purchase, acquired in 
2015 for an undisclosed amount) 
– Golden Road Brewing (California-based firm selling 45,000 barrels/year at time of purchase, acquired 
in 2015 for an undisclosed amount) 
– Four Peaks Brewing Company (Arizona-based firm selling 70,000 barrels/year at time of purchase, 
acquired in 2015 for an undisclosed amount) 
– Breckenridge Brewery (Colorado-based firm selling 70,000 barrels/year at time of purchase, acquired 
in 2015 for an undisclosed amount) 
– Devils Backbone Brewing Company (Virginia-based firm selling 60,000 barrels/year at time of pur-
chase, acquired in 2016 for an undisclosed amount) 
– Karbach Brewing Company (Texas-based firm selling 40,000 barrels/year at time of purchase, ac-
quired in 2016 for an undisclosed amount) 
– Wicked Weed Brewing (North Carolina-based firm selling 40,000 barrels/year at time of purchase, 
acquired in 2017 for an undisclosed amount) 
 
 
7 MillerCoors and the Craft Segment 
 
Other macrobrewers have since made similar acquisitive forays into craft beer. MillerCoors acquired 
Terrapin Beer Company in 2011, Crispin Cider in 2012, Saint Archer Brewing in 2015, and Revolver 
Brewing and Hop Valley in 2016. Constellation, the American distributor of prominent Mexican beers 
Corona and Modelo, acquired Ballast Point in 2015 and Funky Buddha in 2017. Additionally, Heineken 
USA acquired a 50% share of Lagunitas in 2015 before purchasing the remaining share of the company 
in 2017. This progression of acquisitions reveals the increased desire of Big Beer to cross the line be- 
tween macrobrewed lagers and craft beer varieties to capitalize on the consumer demand for product 
differentiation and to integrate acquired craft brewers into their established distribution channels. 
 
8 A Case Study 
 
To  better understand the economic consequences of craft beer acquisitions by a macrobrewer, we examine 
in detail the consequences of ABI’s acquisition of Goose Island. Goose Island is a worthy “representative 
firm” (in Alfred Marshall’s use of the term). Goose Island was the largest craft brewer in Chicago at 
the time of its acquisition; and it was acquired by the largest macrobrewer (ABI).20 The leading brand 
of Goose Island was “312” which is the area code for Chicago. What makes our use of the acquisition 
 
 
19 The Craft Brew Alliance is a brewing company consisting of five beer and cider brands: Redhook, Widmer 
Brothers, Kona, Omission, and Square Mile Cider. CBA was founded in 2008 and then in 2013 sold a 32.2% 
share of the business to ABI, which became the company’s distribution partner. 
20 “[Goose Island] was an undeniably exciting place to work during an exciting time. The secret of variety, 
choice, and innovation was out; everyone wanted a piece of craft beer. Breweries were opening at the rate of 
one a day. Chicago had gone from one production brewery-Goose Island-to nearly a dozen. Goose Island was 
in the midst of a sixteen-year run of winning twenty-five medals at the Great American Beer Festival-at least 
once every year.” (Noel, p. 146) 
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especially fitting (if not ironic) is that Goose Island 312 is now brewed at an ABI brewery in Baldwinsville, 
New York (where the area code is 315).21 
 
9 AB InBev Goose Island: The Competition Issue 
 
Economic theory provides several possible strategic responses that could be the consequence of a major 
brewer acquiring a craft brewer. Given the number of craft brewers, and the relative ease of entry into 
the craft segment, it is plausible that craft brewery acquisitions would have no price effect on craft beer.  
Thus, if the market for craft beer were competitive, ABI would have no ability to raise the price of Goose 
Island beer, and no incentive to lower its price. Under this scenario, there should be no antitrust concern. 
If the acquiring firm can exploit scale economies in production or take advantage of distribution 
economies in promoting the acquired brand to retail accounts, one would expect a decrease in the price 
of Goose Island beer and expansion of volume and sales. If this is the case, the antitrust authorities 
 should applaud such acquisitions. 
If ABI’s acquisition of Goose Island affords ABI the ability to raise the price floor under craft beer by 
raising the price points of its mainline products (e.g., Budweiser and Busch), then such an acquisition may 
harm consumer welfare. Additionally, due to the regulatory characteristics of the three-tier system, ABI 
could use its influence on distributors to foreclose the market to rivals in the craft beer segment. This 
may differentially affect states based on the legal regimes that govern their specific markets for alcoholic 
beverages, as discussed in Burgdorf (2019). If either of these occur, such acquisitions merit the attention 




We use Nielsen scanner data provided by the Kilts Center for Marketing Data Center at the University 
of Chicago Booth School of Business to explore whether there is evidence of foreclosure. Specifically, 
we utilize the Retail Scanner Dataset to observe sales of beer at the month-store-product level. In the 
Nielsen dataset, sales are recorded at the end of each week, and a volume-weighted price is reported, 
though we aggregate up to the month level.22 We calculate both the total volume (in ounces) sold of 
each beer in each store in addition to the total dollar amount of each beer sold in each store. We use 
these to calculate the effective price per ounce of each brand of beer (e.g., Goose Island 312) at each 
store and total sales (total revenue) for each brand of beer at each store. 
Due to sales promotions, stockpiling, and uneven consumption around occasions such as the Super 
Bowl and the Fourth of July, sales may be choppy at the week level. By aggregating sales to the month in 
which they were reported, we avoid the influence of outliers due to holiday or sporting event consumption 
spikes and the pitfalls of having too many zeroes in our data. We also reduce the number of data points, 
which allows us to expand the geographical scope of our sample and keep the computational burden of 
the large size of the Nielsen dataset manageable. 
Product characteristics such as brand, package-type, and volume also are included. We restrict our 
sample to beer sold in six packs of 11.2 ounce or 12-ounce bottles.23 If different pack sizes were included, 
we would have to control for and explain the price differences due to quantity discounts.24 Additionally, 
packs including more than six bottles of beer are often only sold by macrobrewers and large craft 
brewers who have invested in the machinery to package larger pack sizes, creating a possible selection 
issue. Furthermore, it is unlikely consumers are substituting from six packs to other multi-packs as they 
do between six packs. By limiting our analysis to six packs, we move closer to an apples-to-apples instead 
of oranges-to-apples comparison. 
 
 
21 For a recent (“light” pun intended) account of ABI’s acquisition of Goose Island, see Noel (2018). 
22 Beer sales are not evenly spaced across the week. Because of this, as well as for simplicity during data 
aggregation, we count the whole week’s worth of sales in the month that sales are reported. For instance, if 
sales are reported on the third of the month, the entire week of sales are recorded as having occurred in that 
month. 
23 Bottles that contain 11.2 ounces of beer hold one-third of a liter. European brewers and brewers that 
follow the European tradition may use this size instead of the 12-ounce size Americans use. To the untrained 
eye they are the same as those that hold 12 ounces of beer and are frequently placed next to each other in 
stores and sold as if they had the same fill. 
24 It is known that the major brewers engage in price discrimination as part of their competitive strategy but 
we can find no precedent in the literature studying this to follow and leave analysis of price discrimination in the 
beer industry to future research (Elzinga, 2016). 
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For our results, we develop two samples based on brand information. The first contains all brands of 
craft beer sold in the Nielsen dataset. Descriptive statistics for this sample are located for the premerger 
time period in Table 3 and for the postmerger time period in Table 4. This sample was chosen to ascertain 
if the merger had an effect on craft brands in general, as has been feared by fans of the craft beer segment. 
As mentioned earlier, most craft brewers produce very little beer, and most sell primarily through a 
taproom or brewpub environment, or to on-premise accounts. Only the most successful brewers place 
their beer in the channels observed in the Nielsen dataset. This sample attempts to discern the effects of 
the acquisition on these craft brewers. The second sample contains beers produced by macrobrewers.25 
This sample was chosen to see if the acquisition allowed the macrobrewers to raise prices on their brands 
through the alleviation of competitive pressure from the craft beer segment. Descriptive statistics for 
this sample are located for the premerger time period in Table 5 and for the postmerger time period in 
Table 6. From a market definition perspective, the brands in these two samples may be most likely to 
suffer adverse consequences from an acquisition of a craft brewer by a macrobrewer. 
When the two megabrewers acquire craft brewers, the antitrust authorities might be concerned that 
independent craft brewers will be foreclosed from distribution. In our case study, the concern would be 
that ABI will use the acquisition of Goose Island to foreclose other craft brewers. This can be investigated 
by analyzing the first sample consisting of beers sold by craft brewers. If ABI has used Goose Island to 
foreclose or weaken other craft brewers in the market, we would expect quantity sold to decrease. If ABI 
has created a more efficient rival in Goose Island, we would expect prices to decrease, and quantities to 
either stay the same or increase, both procompetitive results. 
A second concern is that the acquiring firm will absorb a craft brewer in order to alleviate the 
competitive pressure on the acquirer’s own products. Here the concern would be that ABI will position 
Goose Island’s pricing in a way that will induce substitution to the lager brands of the macrobrewers, 
leading to sustained or increased prices of these products and growth in their volume. This can be 
investigated by analyzing the second sample of beers produced by macrobrewers consisting of brands 
from ABI, MillerCoors, Heineken, Pabst, and Constellation. If ABI is able to position Goose Island to 
alleviate competitive pricing pressure on its mainstream brands, we should observe increased prices in 
these brands or we should see substitution from craft beer to mainstream brands, resulting in increased 
quantity sold. 
Store characteristics also are included in this dataset; specifically, we identify the Designated Market 
Area (DMA),26 channel type, state, three-digit zip code, FIPS county code, and FIPS state code.27 We 
also identify different retailers based on their store and corporate codes, though the true identity of each 
particular retailer is shielded in the dataset. 
In addition to this information from Nielsen, we also add control variables for income, education, 
alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized 
brewpubs. We control for these because each of these measures is correlated with consumption of beer, 
and craft beer in particular. 
Due to computational limitations, we apply several restrictions to our dataset. First, we limit our 
dataset geographically to Midwestern and mid-Atlantic states that are proximate to Goose Islands focal 
point of Chicago and would be the part of the country most likely to experience the effects, if any, of 
an aggressive expansion of Goose Island sales under the patronage of ABI. The territory we examine 
includes Washington, D.C., Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia. We further limit our 
dataset only to beers sold between 2010 and 2013. This gives us both a pre- and post-period for the 
acquisition of Goose Island by ABI.28 The result is over four million observations at the brand-store- 
month level in the craft beer sample and over six million observations in the macrobrewer sample. Using 
a difference-in-differences framework, we examine the effect of the merger on volume and pricing of craft 
beers and macro lagers. 
 
11 Estimation Approach 
 
Recall that the primary concern of competitors of Goose Island in the craft beer segment is that ABI will 
exploit distributor relationships to induce substitution towards Goose Island and away from “true craft” 
 
 
25 We include all beers sold by ABI, Constellation, MillerCoors, Heineken, and Pabst. 
26 These regions are determined by Nielsen based upon the regional reach of metro area commercial TV 
channels. 
27 FIPS codes, or Federal Information Processing Standards, are five-digit codes that uniquely identify counties 
or county-equivalent jurisdictions in the United States. 
28 The acquisition occurred on March 28, 2011. 
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beers. If this is true, the potential effect of the merger should be stronger in stores and markets where 
ABI has a greater share of market and thus has more influence over their distributors. The National Beer 
Wholesalers Association (2016) expressed its concern that ABI 
 
“encourages distributors to drop rival beers and replace it with an ABI owned “craft” to replace 
any lost sales. ABI may threaten the ability of a distributor to transfer its business. The pressure 
to drop rival beers does not end there. ABI executives have frequently visited distributors that 
choose to sell non-ABI products to encourage them otherwise, and publicly criticize distributors 
that carry non-ABI brands at trade meetings.” 
 
To address this, we would like to know the actual share of revenue or profits generated by ABI for each 
of its distributors in each of its retail stores. Unfortunately, that information is not publicly available. 
However, Nielsen data do allow us to find the market share at the store-month level captured by ABI 
products. 
The variable ABI Market Share is defined as the premerger market share (determined by revenue) 
of AB InBev branded products for a particular store. We implement our difference-in-differences model 
with this as our “treatment” or comparison variable, making this akin to an intent to treat specification. 
We adopt this because the economic concern of the merger is that AB InBev will use its market power 
to foreclose other craft brewers, or use its portfolio, now including Goose Island, to move pricing in such 
a way as to alleviate pressure on its mainline brands and portfolio in general. We expect that stores 
having significant sales of ABI brands in the premerger period should be more affected than stores whose 
revenue is largely sourced from other firms due to the influence of the distribution tier on off-premise 
sales. This specification also allows us to drill into the effects of the merger at the store level. 
The Goose Island acquisition was announced on March 28, 2011, and we use this date to demarcate the 
premerger and postmerger time periods.29 Our standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered 
at the store level in all models.30 We implement a fixed-effects model at the product-store level, which 
should control for time-invariant differences in individual stores’ pricing strategies of individual brands. 
We model our difference-in-differences framework with five separate specifications and three outcome 
variables of interest. Our first specification regresses each dependent variable against a dummy variable 
that is equal to 1 for the post-acquisition time period (Post), the ABI Market Share variable, and an 
interaction term of these two variables (Post x ABI Market Share). Commensurate with the typical 
difference-in-differences approach, this interaction term is the variable of interest. If our estimates are 
causal, the coefficient on this term will reveal the positive or negative impact of the acquisition on each 
of the dependent variables of interest. We implement several improvements over the nave regression of 
our first specification. 
Our second specification adds yearly time effects and our third specification adds year and DMA 
(Designated Market Area) interactions to the yearly time effects of our second specification.31 Our 
fourth specification adds year and retailer interactions to both the yearly effects and the year and DMA 
interactions.32 Our fifth, final, and preferred specification adds the control variables mentioned above to 
the fixed effects in the fourth specification. 
The fifth specification is preferable for several reasons. First, it includes yearly time fixed effects to 
control for the significant growth of the craft beer industry over this period. Second, it includes year and 
Designated Market Area interaction terms. Craft beer demand and growth has a distinct geographical 
profile. They are concentrated in certain areas, and both are heterogeneous across areas and time. These 
interactions control for this. We include year and retailer interactions because, within the beer industry, 
there are distinct differences across channels in terms of breadth of offerings and types of beer sold. 
Typically, selection is wider at liquor stores than supermarkets, where selection is wider than convenience 
stores. That said, within these channels there also is variation in the selection of beers offered. 
Retailers such as Walmart have a different inventory portfolio than Target, just as Whole Foods will 
offer different brands and package sizes than Kroger.33 However, due to the three-tier system, retailers 
may interact with distributors at a higher level than the individual store. This approach captures more 
heterogeneity than the typical channel-level analysis, but also takes into account the idiosyncrasies of 
the three-tier system. Moreover, by including the time interaction, we allow these effects to fluctuate as 
the craft beer landscape evolves and as retailers respond.  
 
 
29  The postmerger time period begins in April of 2011 and the premerger time period ends in March of 2011. 
30 Note this is individual store level, not retailer level. 
31  We do not include month and DMA interactions due to computational restrictions. 
32 We do not include month and retailer interactions due to computational restrictions. 
33  In the Nielsen dataset, because retailers names are masked, our results do not imply anything concerning 
these specific stores. 
Has Anheuser-Busch Let the Steam Out of Craft Beer? The Economics of Acquiring Craft Brewers 9 
 
 
Finally, we include the battery of demographic controls (income, education, alcohol consumption, and 
year of brewpub legalization) to control for state level factors that may affect consumption patterns of 
craft beer. We choose to do this at the state level because we are unable to disaggregate available data 
to the DMA level. We apply these five specifications to our triple-difference framework as well. 
This results in a difference-in-differences model that has the following specification: 
 
 
log(priceijkmt) = β0 + β1P ostt + β2ABI Market Sharek + 
β3P ost ∗ ABI Market Sharekt + β4Xijkt+ 
τt + γmt + αkt + δijkm + ijkmt (1) 
That is, we regress the log of price (or quantity) of a particular brand of beer (i) sold in a particular 
store (j) that belongs to a particular retailer (k) in a particular DMA (m) at a particular time (t) against 
the difference-in-differences variables and a battery of controls and fixed effects. 
We study three outcome variables of interest: (1) the log of price per ounce; (2) log of total sales; and 
(3) the number of competing brands sold in the store. The first two outcome variables are conventional 
variables in merger retrospectives. We wish to know if price has decreased, commensurate with efficiencies 
dominating merger related effects, or if price has increased, commensurate with coordination dominating 
merger related effects. Similarly, increasing total sales at the brand-store level may be indicative of a 
procompetitive merger and decreasing total sales may be indicative of an anticompetitive merger, such 
as would occur if AB InBev foreclosed other craft brewers from the market. 
The craft beer segment competes for consumer patronage more through product differentiation than 
by price. Consumer welfare is a function not only of price but also quality. For this reason, we include 
a measure of the number of brands that compete within a store, to attempt to identify the effect of the 
acquisition on one quality metric, product variety. For each craft beer product, we calculate the number 
of distinct types of craft beers that are sold in the relevant store-month in the sample of craft beer and 
for each macro beer product we calculate the number of distinct types of macro beers that are sold in 
the relevant store-month for the sample of macro beers. 
 
 
12 Results: Craft Beer Sample 
 
We find no impact on the price of craft beer due to the acquisition of Goose Island by ABI. Results are in 
Table 9. This implies that while the acquisition did not have an anti-competitive effect on consumers from 
a rise in price of craft beer, there is also not evidence that the efficiency gains from ABI’s superior 
technology and production capability were passed on to consumers of craft beer through aggressive price 
competition. We do find statistically significant evidence that the volume of sales of craft beer increased 
postmerger in stores that had larger market share premerger of ABI products. This implies that the 
amount of craft beer sold per week has increased in those stores that may have been more likely to be 
affected by the acquisition, perhaps as a result of aggressive marketing of Goose Island by ABI that may 
have spilled over to other brands. Results are located in Table 11. However, results on the impact of the 
acquisition on the number of craft beer brands sold, shown in Table 13, indicates that the number of craft 
beer brands has decreased in these stores, as we found statistically significant and negative effects on 
the number of competing craft beer brands sold in stores postmerger with a greater share of premerger 
ABI revenue. Together this is interesting, while there seems to be some confirmation of craft brewers’ 
fear of being foreclosed on entering stores where ABI has a larger market share, conditional on gaining 
shelf space in these stores, the acquisition of Goose Island appears to be a boon to craft brewers. 
 
 
13 Results: Macro Beer Sample 
 
In terms of movement within macro beers, we find statistically significant evidence of postmerger increases 
in price of macro beer products in stores with larger premerger ABI market share, but statistically 
significant evidence of sales decreases for these products. Results are in Table 15 and Table 17. That 
these are opposite in direction show that while macrobrewers may have tried to jockey their products to a 
higher price point with the new portfolio of craft beer, sales levels were not maintained and it is unlikely 
this was profitable. This is mixed evidence towards macro brewers taking advantage of oligopoly power 
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in these markets. In terms of number of competing macro beer brands, we find no statistical evidence of 
change postmerger, and show our results in Table 19. 
 
 
14 Results: Goose Island Sample 
 
Crucially, we would like to know the impact of the acquisition on sales of Goose Island beer itself. We 
investigate this by looking at a subsample of our craft beer sample consisting of only Goose Island 
brands. If the acquisition resulted in increased access and consumption of Goose Island it would be a 
boon to consumers, as would any price decreases passed through from efficiency gains made as a result 
of the acquisition. We first look at price effects and find that ABI maintained prices and did not pass 
through any achieved efficiencies to consumers, evidenced by no statistical change in price. Results are 
located in Table 21. Second, we look at sales. If ABI was aggressive in marketing Goose Island we would 
expect increases in sales of the brand. We cannot conclude the coefficient on the difference-in-differences 
interaction term is statistically significant but do observe positive coefficients on our regression of sales of 




15 Regional Analysis: Illinois 
 
It has become apparent that ABI’s acquisitions have a distinct regional flavor to them. Each of the 
ten acquisitions is at the heart of a state or metro area that has seen tremendous growth in the craft 
segment. For that reason, a natural question is whether or not there are different effects in the regions 
these craft brewers are located compared to broader geographic areas. We first analyze the effect on craft 
beer sold in Illinois. Results are located in Table 25. We find much larger effects on sales and price than 
our more general analysis, for sales we find an effect almost five times that estimated in our more general 
sample as well as larger and statistically significant effects on price compared to that estimated in the 
more general sample. We find a negative effect on the number of brands of craft beer sold in individual 
stores more than twice that of our more general sample. It is clear that there have been much larger 
merger-related effects in the market for craft beer in Goose Island’s home state of Illinois than elsewhere. 
This contrasts with our estimates from our macro beer sample in Illinois, which are located in Table 27. 
These coefficient estimates are similar for price and sales effects but larger, negative, and significant when 
analyzing the variety of brands of macro beer sold in stores compared to our more general geographic 
sample. Finally, we analyzed the impact on sales and price of Goose Island in Illinois, finding no impact 
on price but large, positive impacts on sales after the acquisition of Goose Island ten times that of the 
estimates from the more general sample. Results are located in Table 29. Together it appears that ABI 
has greatly expanded sales of Goose Island in Illinois at the expense of many smaller craft breweries. 
 
 
16 Channel Level Analysis 
 
We next analyze whether or not the acquisition had heterogeneous effects across different channel types. 
The Nielsen database allows us to observe whether each product was sold in a convenience store, drug 
store, food (grocery) store, or mass merchandiser. The exact identity of each of the retailers is hidden 
and unknown to us. We re-analyze the price, sales, and product variety effects in our macro, craft, and 
Goose Island samples by breaking the data into sub-samples for each of these four types of stores. Results 
are in Tables 31-45. We observe several interesting findings. First, we observe that increases in sales of 
craft beer are driven by stores in the convenience, drug, and mass merchandiser channels and not in 
grocery stores. We find large positive coefficients in these channels that range between roughly two and 
four times the magnitude observed in our full sample, and a smaller and statistically insignificant 
estimate on the interaction term in the grocery channel. This lends credence to the theory that ABI is 
spurring sales of craft beer in these channels where there is less variety of choice. Conditional on Goose 
Island being available on the shelf, ABI may drive more traffic to its own product option. Second, the 
loss of sales in macro beers are driven by drug stores but no meaningful loss is observed among mass 
merchandisers. This may be an artifact of our sample excluding non six-pack package sizes, as these two 
channels sell mainly very large or very small (single) packages of beer. Nonetheless, while estimates are 
generally in line with those of the full sample for convenience and grocery stores, drug stores observe 
an effect more than double the magnitude observed in the full sample. Finally, we observe weak price 
decrease in price of Goose Island beer in grocery stores as in the full sample, but large and positive 
increases in price in mass merchandise stores, suggesting that craft beer may be earning a premium in 
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One swallow does not make a Spring and one case study of an acquisition does not prove a proposition. 
Nonetheless, in watching for Spring we do look for swallows. For that reason, the ABI-Goose Island 
acquisition is a fitting case study of the economic consequences of combining a megabrewer with a 
prominent craft brewer.34 To the extent this case study is a harbinger of others, however, the standard 
price-quantity consequences studied in merger retrospectives of the ABI-Goose Island combination fail 
to confirm the fears that many had that the acquisition of Goose Island by ABI would hamper other 
craft brewers and consumers. 
If the ABI-Goose Island amalgamation is a reflection of other such combinations, present and future, 
our study suggests that beer drinkers are not worse off in terms of the usual consumer welfare metrics 
of price and output. To the extent consumers value the Brandeisian merits of small business and de- 
rive utility from the purchasing the product of locally owned firms, the acquisition of craft brewers by 
megabrewers reduces the choice set of (true) craft beers with these attributes. Fortunately, through the 
rapid rise of on-premise outlets, the increasing supply of new entrants in the craft segment comes at a 
more rapid rate than the current propensity of megabrewers to acquire them or foreclose them from shelf 







































34  It is the one such acquisition to merit a book length treatment (Noel, 2018) whose author also 
extrapolates the lesson of this combination to the craft segment as a whole. 
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Table 1: Beer Sales by Segment in the US 
 
 Market Share 2018 
Market Share 2013 
Imports  17.4 13.3 Craft  12.4 7.8 
Superpremium  7.9 6.9 
Cider  4.5 3.7 
 High End 0.9 0.6 
Premium Regular  43.2 32.4 Premium Light  7.7 9.7 




Subpremium Light  10.0 11.5 
Malt Liquor  8.5 9.6 
 Subpremium 2.1 2.6 
No Alcohol  20.6 23.7 
 
 
Source: Beer Marketer’s Insights  





Table 3: Beer Sales by Segment in the US 
 
Brand Bbls 2018 Market Share 
2018 
Bbls 2008 
Corona Extra 8,580 23.8 7,940 
Modelo 
Especial 
8,180 22.7 1,810 
Heineken 3,800 10.6 4,950 
Stella Artois 2,675 7.4 755 
Dos Equis 1,900 5.3 725 
Corona Light 1,125 3.1 925 
Guinness 1,110 3.1 980 
Corona 
Familiar 
730 2.0  
P cifico 725 2.0 360 
Tecate 680 1.9 1,515 
Top 10 Brands 29,505 82.0 19,960 
Others 6,495 18.0 8,929 
Total Imports 36,000 100.0 28,889 
 
Source: Beer Marketer’s Insights  





Table 5: Premerger Summary Statistics, Craft Beer Sample 
 
 mean sd min max Six Pack Price 8.192643 1.348875 .01 24 
Six Pack Sold 9.121971 17.46063 1 1698 
Total Sales 72.78735 148.2007 .01 15858.57 
Goose Island Sold in Store-week .5444173 .4980234 0 1 
ABI Market Share .2284364 .1168051 0 .9860957 
brewpub legalization year 1987.113 2.356039 1985 1993 
Percent bachelor’s degree or higher, 25 and 
over 
28.04414 4.72663 17.5 36.9 
Per Capita Income (chained 2012 dollars) 48884.35 5264.827 36910 66706 
Per capita ethanol consumption from beer 1.214892 .1500962 .89 1.49 
Per capita ethanol consumption from wine .3279882 .1025704 .1 .66 
Per capita ethanol consumption from 
spirits 
.7020477 .1911048 .44 1.36 
Total Brands Sold 112.1514 57.30957 1 331 
Craft Beer Brands Sold 44.37833 33.17063 1 189 
Observations 1111201    
 
Number of Brands Sold in Store 
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Table 6: Postmerger Summary Statistics, Craft Beer Sample 
 
 mean sd min max 
Six Pack Price 8.672829 1.44457 .01 65.94 
Six Pack Sold 9.276056 20.14404 .9333333 2663 
Total Sales 78.15854 188.9804 .01 31929.37 
Goose Island Sold in Store-week .7156956 .4510826 0 1 
ABI Market Share .2289627 .1312322 0 1 
Brewpub Legalization Year 1987.084 2.271642 1985 1993 
Percent bachelor’s degree or higher, 25 and 
over 
29.02666 4.644906 18.5 37.4 
Per Capita Income (chained 2012 dollars) 49900.8
2 
4875.026 37405 68310 
Per capita ethanol consumption from beer 1.176728 .1455296 .84 1.46 
Per capita ethanol consumption from wine .3541886 .0947028 .1 .72 
Per capita ethanol consumption from 
spirits 
.72547 .1909979 .46 1.63 
Total Brands Sold 130.2513 67.95475 1 404 
Craft Beer Brands Sold 64.28937 46.12406 1 267 
Observations 3479193    
 
 
Table 7: Premerger Summary Statistics, Macro Beer Sample 
 
 mean sd min max 
Six Pack Price 6.433155 1.355273 .01 20 
Six Pack Sold 12.10633 15.37041 .9333333 1671 
Total Sales 75.21994 93.34719 .01 8672.49 
Goose Island Sold in Store-week .3956651 .4889932 0 1 
ABI Market Share .3054471 .1716414 0 1 
Brewpub Legalization Year 1987.449 2.627596 1985 1993 
Percent bachelor’s degree or higher, 25 and 
over 
27.85404 4.887537 17.5 36.9 
Per Capita Income (chained 2012 dollars) 48445.99 5686.22 36910 68310 
Per capita ethanol consumption from beer 1.192587 .1455707 .89 1.49 
Per capita ethanol consumption from wine .3266767 .1031089 .1 .69 
Per capita ethanol consumption from 
spirits 
.7004236 .178198 .44 1.52 
Total Brands Sold 79.26268 51.63728 1 331 
Macro Beer Brands Sold 38.58319 17.03259 1 86 
Observations 1953498    
 
 
Table 8: Postmerger Summary Statistics, Macro Beer Sample 
 
 mean sd min max 
Six Pack Price 6.884017 1.339058 .01 119.615 
Six Pack Sold 12.17785 15.22255 .9333333 1472 
Total Sales 81.92596 103.0672 .01 9936 
Goose Island Sold in Store-week .5219289 .499519 0 1 
ABI Market Share .2982102 .1720245 0 1 
Brewpub Legalization Year 1987.412 2.579948 1985 1993 
Percent bachelor’s degree or higher, 25 and 
over 
28.82931 4.909575 18.5 37.4 
Per Capita Income (chained 2012 dollars) 49369.57 5386.312 37405 68310 
Per capita ethanol consumption from beer 1.159184 .1469885 .84 1.46 
Per capita ethanol consumption from wine .3516101 .1004513 .1 .72 
Per capita ethanol consumption from 
spirits 
.7353005 .1877256 .46 1.63 
Total Brands Sold 89.16157 61.40486 1 404 
Macro Beer Brands Sold 37.19947 16.65444 1 84 
Observations 4127748    
 
 
Table 9: Fixed Effects Model (D-i-D), Craft Beer Sample (Dependent Variable = Log of Price) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Post × ABI Market Share 0.0290∗∗∗ 0.0303∗∗∗ 0.00560 0.000951 0.000025
1     (0.00328) ) 
  (0.00330) (0.00355) (0.00316) (0.00312) 
Observations 4589530 4589530 4589530 4589530 4589530 
Time Fixed Effects?  Y Y Y Y Time × DMA Interactions? 
Time × Retailer Interactions? 
Demographic Controls 






Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗  p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
Table 10: * 
Dependent variable is the log of price per ounce of a particular beer in a particular store. Sample includes all 
craft beer sold by brewers meeting the Brewers Association definition of a craft brewer in Washington, D.C., 
Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold 
in packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA 
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer 
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data 
set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the 
state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs. 
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Table 11: Fixed Effects Model (D-i-D), Craft Beer Sample (Dependent Variable = Log of Sales) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Post × ABI Market Share 0.112∗∗∗ 
  (0.0226) 
0.107∗∗∗ 






  (0.0249) 
Observations 4590394 4590394 4590394 4590394 4590394 
Time Fixed Effects?  Y Y Y Y Time × DMA Interactions? 
Time × Retailer Interactions 
Demographic Controls 






Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗  p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
Table 12: * 
Dependent variable is the log of sales (in total dollars sold) of a particular beer in a particular store. Sample 
includes all craft beer sold by brewers meeting the Brewers Association definition of a craft brewer in Washington, 
D.C., Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in 
packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions 
are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions 
are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set). 
Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-
year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs. 
 
 
Table 13: Fixed Effects Model (D-i-D), Craft Beer Sample (Dependent Variable = Number of Brands Sold in 
 Store) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Post × ABI Market Share 0.0186∗  









Observations 4590394 4590394 4590394 4590394 4590394 
Time Fixed Effects?  Y Y Y Y Time × DMA Interactions? 
Time × Retailer Interactions? 
Demographic Controls 






Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗  p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
Table 14: * 
Dependent variable is the number of craft beer brands sold in a particular store. Sample includes all craft beer 
sold by brewers meeting the Brewers Association definition of a craft brewer in Washington, D.C., Delaware, 
Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six 
are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are 
interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are 
interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set). 
Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-
year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs. 
 
 
Table 15: Fixed Effects Model (D-i-D), Macro Beer Sample (Dependent Variable = Log of Price) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Post × ABI Market Share 0.0639∗∗∗ 









Observations 6080662 6080662 6080662 6080662 6080662 
Time Fixed Effects?  Y Y Y Y Time × DMA Interactions? 
Time × Retailer Interactions? 
Demographic Controls 






Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗  p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
Table 16: * 
Dependent variable is the log of price per ounce of a particular beer in a particular store. Sample includes 
macro beer sold by AB InBev, Constellation, MillerCoors, Heineken, and Pabst in Washington, D.C., Delaware, 
Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six 
are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are 
interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are 
interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set). 
Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-
year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs. 
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Table 17: Fixed Effects Model (D-i-D), Macro Beer Sample (Dependent Variable = Log of Sales) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Post × ABI Market Share -0.00938 -0.0117 -0.0571∗∗∗ -0.0799∗∗∗ -0.0808∗∗∗ 
 (0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) 
Observations 6081246 6081246 6081246 6081246 6081246 
Time Fixed Effects?  Y Y Y Y Time × DMA Interactions? 
Time × Retailer Interactions? 
Demographic Controls 






Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗  p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
Table 18: * 
Dependent variable is the log of sales (in total dollars sold) of a particular beer in a particular store. Sample 
includes macro beer sold by AB InBev, Constellation, MillerCoors, Heineken, and Pabst in Washington, D.C., 
Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold 
in packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA 
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer 
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data 
set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the 
state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs. 
 
 
Table 19: Fixed Effects Model (D-i-D), Macro Beer Sample (Dependent Variable = Number of Brands 
Sold in Store) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Post × ABI Market Share -1.874∗∗∗ -1.836∗∗∗ 0.287 -0.344 -0.303 
 (0.278) (0.277) (0.303) (0.280) (0.282) 
Observations 6081246 6081246 6081246 6081246 6081246 
Time Fixed Effects?  Y Y Y Y Time × DMA Interactions? 
Time × Retailer Interactions? 
Demographic Controls 






Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗  p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
Table 20: * 
Dependent variable is the number of macro beer brands sold in a particular store. Sample includes macro 
beer sold by AB InBev, Constellation, MillerCoors, Heineken, and Pabst in Washington, D.C., Delaware, Iowa, 
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six are included 
in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are interactions 
between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are interactions 
between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls 
include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the 
year the state legalized brewpubs. 
 
 
Table 21: Fixed Effects Model (D-i-D), Goose Island Beer Sample (Dependent Variable = Log of Price) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Post × ABI Market Share -0.107∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.0345∗∗∗ -0.00720 -0.0125 
 (0.00990)   (0.00990) (0.00956) (0.00874)   (0.00836) 
Observations 187877 187877 187877 187877 187877 
Time Fixed Effects?  Y Y Y Y Time × DMA Interactions? 
Time × Retailer Interactions? 
Demographic Controls 






Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗  p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
Table 22: * 
Dependent variable is the log of price per ounce of a particular beer in a particular store. Sample includes beer 
produced by Goose Island in Washington, D.C., Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 
2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables 
at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated 
Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of 
retailers is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption 
from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs. 
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Table 23: Fixed Effects Model (D-i-D), Goose Island Beer Sample (Dependent Variable = Log of Sales) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Post × ABI Market Share 0.422∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.188∗  0.0609 0.0607 
  (0.0818) (0.0823) (0.0882) (0.0885)  (0.0880) 
Observations 187877 187877 187877 187877 187877 
Time Fixed Effects?  Y Y Y Y Time × DMA Interactions? 
Time × Retailer Interactions? 
Demographic Controls 






Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗  p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
Table 24: * 
Dependent variable is the log of sales (in total dollars sold) of a particular beer in a particular store. Sample 
includes beer produced by Goose Island in Washington, D.C., Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West 
Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time 
effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen 
defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen 
retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include income, education, 




Table 25: Fixed Effects Model, Craft Beer Sold in Illinois 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 






Observations 586839 586787 586839 
Dependent Variable? Log of Sales Log of Price Number of Brands 
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y                 Y 
Time × DMA Interactions? 












Standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗  p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
Table 26: * 
Sample includes all craft beer sold by brewers meeting the Brewers Association definition of a craft brewer in 
Illinois between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects 
are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined 
DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer 
id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol 
consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs. 
 
 
Table 27: Fixed Effects Model, Macro Beer Sold in Illinois 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Post × ABI Market Share 0.0630 -0.00563 -5.757∗∗∗ 
 (0.0651) (0.00611) (0.889) 
Observations 706790 706633 706790 
Dependent Variable? Log of Sales Log of Price Number of Brands 
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y Y 
Time × DMA Interactions? 












Standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗  p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
Table 28: * 
Sample includes macro beer sold by AB InBev, Constellation, MillerCoors, Heineken, and Pabst in Illinois 
between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects are 
dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined 
DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer 
id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol 
consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs. 
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Table 29: Fixed Effects Model, Goose Island Beer Sold in Illinois 
 
 (1) (2) 
Post × ABI Market Share 0.603∗  -0.01000 
 (0.303) (0.0220) 
Observations 66616 66616 
Dependent Variable? Log of Sales Log of Price 
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y 
Time × DMA Interactions? 









Standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗  p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
Table 30: * 
Sample includes beer produced by Goose Island in Illinois between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer 
sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA 
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer 
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data 
set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at 
the state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs. 
 
 
Table 31: Fixed Effects Model, Craft Beer Channel Sub-analysis (Dependent variable = Log of Price) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post × ABI Market Share 0.00987 0.0214 -0.00678∗  -0.0124 
 (0.0112)  (0.0128) (0.00312) 
  (0.0146) 
Observations 48085 301425 4067326 173558 
Store Type Convenience Drug Food Mass 
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y 
Time × DMA Interactions? 















Standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗  p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
Table 32: * 
Dependent variable is the log of price per ounce of a particular beer in a particular store. Sample includes all 
craft beer sold by brewers meeting the Brewers Association definition of a craft brewer in Washington, D.C., 
Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold 
in packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA 
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer 
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data 
set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the 
state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs. 
 
 
Table 33: Fixed Effects Model, Craft Beer Channel Sub-analysis (Dependent variable = Log of Sales) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post × ABI Market Share 0.391∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.0602 0.255∗∗ 
 (0.142)   (0.0474)   (0.0330) (0.0834) 
Observations 48085 301425 4067326 173558 
Store Type Convenience Drug Food Mass 
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y 
Time × DMA Interactions? 















Standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗  p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
Table 34: * 
Dependent variable is the log of sales (in total dollars sold) of a particular beer in a particular store. Sample 
includes all craft beer sold by brewers meeting the Brewers Association definition of a craft brewer in Washington, 
D.C., Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in 
packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions 
are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions 
are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set). 
Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-
year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs. 
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Table 35: Fixed Effects Model, Craft Beer Channel Sub-analysis (Dependent variable = Number of Brands Sold 
in Store) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post × ABI Market Share -1.155 -7.630∗∗  -36.06∗∗∗ -2.369 
 (1.785) (2.456) (4.037) (2.376) 
Observations 48085 301425 4067326 173558 
Store Type Convenience Drug Food Mass 
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y 
Time × DMA Interactions? 















Standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗  p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
Table 36: * 
Dependent variable is the number of macro beer brands sold in a particular store. Sample includes all craft 
beer sold by brewers meeting the Brewers Association definition of a craft brewer in Washington, D.C., 
Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold 
in packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA 
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer 
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data 
set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the 
state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs. 
 
 
Table 37: Fixed Effects Model, Macro Beer Channel Sub-analysis (Dependent variable = Log of Price) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








Observations 267473 896323 4483428 434022 
Store Type Convenience Drug Food Mass 
Time Fixed Effects? Y          Y          Y          Y 
Time × DMA Interactions? 















Standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗  p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
Table 38: * 
Dependent variable is the log of price per ounce of a particular beer in a particular store. Sample includes 
macro beer sold by AB InBev, Constellation, MillerCoors, Heineken, and Pabst in Washington, D.C., Delaware, 
Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six 
are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are 
interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are 
interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set). 
Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-
year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs. 
 
 
Table 39: Fixed Effects Model, Macro Beer Channel Sub-analysis (Dependent variable = Log of Sales) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post × ABI Market Share -0.0607 -0.193∗∗∗ -0.0683∗∗∗ 0.0106 
 (0.0615) (0.0298) (0.0168) (0.0414) 
Observations 267473 896323 4483428 434022 
Store Type Convenience Drug Food Mass 
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y 
Time × DMA Interactions? 















Standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗  p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
Table 40: * 
Dependent variable is the log of sales (in total dollars sold) of a particular beer in a particular store. Sample 
includes macro beer sold by AB InBev, Constellation, MillerCoors, Heineken, and Pabst in Washington, D.C., 
Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold 
in packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA 
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer 
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data 
set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the 
state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs. 
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Table 41: Fixed Effects Model, Macro Beer Channel Sub-analysis (Dependent variable = Number of Brands Sold 
in Store) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post × ABI Market Share -0.985 0.130 -0.311 0.780 
 (0.905) (0.326) (0.430) (0.651) 
Observations 267473 896323 4483428 434022 
Store Type Convenience Drug Food Mass 
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y 
Time × DMA Interactions? 















Standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗  p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
Table 42: * 
Dependent variable is the number of macro beer brands sold in a particular store. Sample includes macro 
beer sold by AB InBev, Constellation, MillerCoors, Heineken, and Pabst in Washington, D.C., Delaware, Iowa, 
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six are included 
in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are interactions 
between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are interactions 
between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls 
include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the 
year the state legalized brewpubs. 
 
 
Table 43: Fixed Effects Model, Goose Island Beer Channel Sub-analysis (Dependent variable = Log of  
Price) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post × ABI Market Share 0.00354 0.0202 -0.0272∗∗  0.0984∗  
 (0.00770) (0.0344) (0.0103) (0.0447) 
Observations 3677 13349 158450 12401 
Store Type Convenience Drug Food Mass 
Time Fixed Effects? Y         Y Y         Y 
Time × DMA Interactions? 















Standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗  p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
Table 44: * 
Dependent variable is the log of price per ounce of a particular beer in a particular store. Sample includes beer 
produced by Goose Island in Washington, D.C., Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 
2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time effects are dummy variables 
at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated 
Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of 
retailers is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption 
from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs. 
 
 
Table 45: Fixed Effects Model, Goose Island Beer Channel Sub-analysis (Dependent variable = Log of 
Sales) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post × ABI Market Share -0.105 0.124 0.0973 -0.0411 
 (0.343) (0.305) (0.113) (0.227) 
Observations 3677 13349 158450 12401 
Store Type Convenience Drug Food Mass 
Time Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y 
Time × DMA Interactions? 















Standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗  p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
Table 46: * 
Dependent variable is the log of sales (in total dollars sold) of a particular beer in a particular store. Sample 
includes beer produced by Goose Island in Washington, D.C., Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West 
Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time 
effects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen 
defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen 
retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include income, education, 
and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized 
brewpubs. 
